Counteracting Diminished Privacy in an Augmented Reality: Protecting Geolocation Privacy by Martinez, Diana
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-2017
Counteracting Diminished Privacy in an
Augmented Reality: Protecting Geolocation
Privacy
Diana Martinez
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Diana Martinez, Note, Counteracting Diminished Privacy in an Augmented Reality: Protecting Geolocation Privacy, 50 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 713 (2017).
[CORRECTED] (10)50.4_MARTINEZ.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/13/19 6:18 PM 
 
713 
COUNTERACTING DIMINISHED PRIVACY IN AN 
AUGMENTED REALITY: PROTECTING 
GEOLOCATION PRIVACY 
Diana Martinez* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you own a house on a quiet street in Maryland. Upon 
driving home from work one day, you notice a large group of 
strangers—children, teenagers, and adults alike—congregated at the 
park across the street. Upon further investigation, you notice a 
common pattern in behavior: each stranger walks around the park 
holding his or her smartphone and swipes upwards on the screen. 
Rather than ask the strangers about their motives, you leave them to 
their devices in hopes that this occurrence is an anomaly. This 
occurrence, however, becomes universal overnight. The next day, you 
see crowds of seemingly antisocial strangers exhibiting the same 
pattern of behavior everywhere: the grocery store, the fountain placed 
outside the museum, and even your neighbor’s lawn. This unusual yet 
ubiquitous behavior is attributed to the mobile application game 
known as Pokémon Go. 
Developed and created by Niantic, Inc., the object of the game is 
to collect virtual creatures by visiting locations in the real world, 
training creatures, and battling other players’ creatures. By tracking 
the player’s geolocation, the application provides a geographic view 
of nearby locations that are fertile for collecting and battling creatures. 
The technology underlying Pokémon Go is augmented reality 
(“AR”) and operates in three steps. An individual end user collects 
information about the physical world through an application on his or 
her device, such as a smartphone or tablet. Next, the application sends 
 
 *  J.D. Candidate, May 2018, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Psychology, 
Neuroscience and Behavior (Music Cognition Specialization), McMaster University.  I would like 
to thank Professor John Nockleby for his guidance, patience, and encouragement throughout the 
law review process.  Most importantly, I would like to thank my parents, Don and Clemencia, for 
their unwavering love and support. 
[CORRECTED] (10)50.4_MARTINEZ.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/13/19  6:18 PM 
714 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:713 
the information to a computer linked to the application’s network, 
which modifies the information. The computer sends the modified 
information back to the end user and superimposes this information on 
the device as though it is inherently part of the physical world.1 
Applying these steps to the first phase of Pokémon Go, first, a 
player enables the application to collect the smartphone’s geolocation 
information from the physical world. The application then sends the 
geolocation information to a computer in Niantic, Inc.’s network to 
determine which virtual creatures are available for collection at nearby 
locations. Lastly, the computer sends this information back to the 
application and superimposes an image of the virtual creature on the 
user’s screen as though it were part of the real world. Because 
gameplay is entirely based on the geolocation of the player’s device, 
Niantic, Inc. necessarily collects, stores, and may disclose this 
information to third parties.2 Therefore, the main privacy concern with 
Pokémon Go is Niantic, Inc.’s unregulated practices involving the 
player’s geolocation information.3 
In the United States, individuals are clearly protected from 
privacy intrusions by the government.4 In contrast, end users may seek 
redress from non-government entities, such as technology 
corporations and mobile application developers, only under certain 
circumstances.5 Currently, there is no federal or state legislation that 
expressly protects an end user’s geolocation privacy from 
non-government entities. Because of this legislative gap, Niantic, Inc. 
may freely collect, store, and disclose a player’s geolocation 
information for unspecified purposes without the end user’s consent. 
The Location Privacy Protection Act (“LPPA”) is a federal bill 
that proposes to bridge this gap by prohibiting a non-government 
entity from collecting or disclosing an end user’s geolocation 
information without consent. This Note critiques the proposed bill on 
 
 1. See infra Part II.A. 
 2. Pokémon GO Privacy Policy, NIANTIC, INC. 4–5, https://www.nianticlabs.com/privacy 
/pokemongo/en (last visited Dec. 21, 2016). 
 3. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 4. See United States v. Jones, 556 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 5. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–79 (2008) (privacy violations arise where 
non-government entities do not notify California residents that they collect or disclose information 
such as social security numbers, but not the resident’s geolocation information); In re Nickelodeon 
Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 287–89 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that there was no privacy 
violation under the Video Privacy Protection Act because an IP address does not personally identify 
the end user). 
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the basis that it fails to regulate non-government entities’ storage 
practices, and recommends legislative amendments. Part II describes 
augmented reality, its application to Pokémon Go, and the surrounding 
data privacy concerns. Part III introduces the framework of data 
privacy law in the U.S. and highlights the difference in privacy actions 
against the government and non-government entities. Part IV focuses 
on the privacy issues associated with geolocation information and the 
governing federal statute. Part V interprets the relevant provisions 
from the proposed LPPA, identifies legislative gaps, and recommends 
appropriate amendments in light of privacy and policy concerns. 
Lastly, Part VI recapitulates the privacy issue posed by Pokémon Go, 
and the importance of the proposed Act and the recommended 
legislative amendments. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM 
A.  Augmented Reality 
In today’s world, completing mundane tasks often involves using 
a device, such as a computer or smartphone. For example, obtaining 
driving directions from the Google Maps website involves turning on 
the computer, logging in, opening the web browser, entering the 
Google Maps website, and typing in the respective address fields. 
Similarly, using the Google Maps smartphone application involves 
unlocking the smartphone, tapping the Google Maps icon, and typing 
in the address fields. In both scenarios, the device—the computer or 
the smartphone—acts as an intermediary between the end user and the 
information. 
Augmented reality (“AR”) eliminates the need for an 
intermediary device by merging information from the digital world 
with the user’s device from the physical world.6 For example, through 
the camera of the user’s device, the IKEA application catalogue allows 
the user to view a potential piece of furniture (e.g., a couch) 
superimposed in a desired room (e.g., a living room),7 thereby merging 
the furniture from the digital world with the actual room from the 
 
 6. See Andreas Kotsios, Privacy in an Augmented Reality, 23 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 157, 
157–58 (2015). 
 7. Paul Ridden, IKEA Catalog Uses Augmented Reality to Give a Virtual Preview of 
Furniture in a Room, NEW ATLAS (Aug. 14, 2013), http://newatlas.com/ikea-augmented-reality-
catalog-app/28703. 
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physical world. The ability to directly superimpose digital information 
on the physical world literally augments reality.8 
The technology underlying AR is relatively simple. AR requires 
an application on a particular device9 to gather information about the 
physical world.10 This information is then relayed to a computer linked 
to the application’s network, which then modifies the information and 
sends back to the application.11 Using the modified information, the 
application projects the information on the device’s camera as if it was 
“overlaid onto the real world.”12 
Because AR merges digital and physical information, this 
technology conveys information to the user much faster than an 
intermediary device, and is used subtly in a variety of contexts, 
including sports,13 interior design,14 and education.15 AR has also been 
adopted in wearable head devices, such as Google Glass, which 
integrates information about a person or object viewed through the 
glasses themselves.16 Most recently, AR has been applied to mobile 
applications.17 
B.  Pokémon Go 
Perhaps AR’s most controversial recent application is the mobile 
application game developed by Niantic, Inc. (“Niantic”) known as 
Pokémon Go.18 Before beginning gameplay, Niantic requires the 
player to take a number of steps.19 Prospective players must sign up 
using a Gmail, Facebook, or Pokémon Trainer Club account.20 After 
signing up, the player must agree to Niantic’s Terms and Services, 
 
 8. Brian D. Wassom, IP in an Augmented Reality, 6 LANDSLIDE 8, 10 (2014). 
 9. Olivia Whitcroft, Augmented Reality—a Leap into a New World, 14 PRIVACY & DATA 
PROTECTION 7 (2013). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Piazza v. Kirkbride, 785 S.E.2d 695, 699 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016) (“the yellow first-down 
line that appears on screen during a televised football game.”). 
 14. See Ridden, supra note 7. 
 15. Anatomy Education Tools, SOFT INTERACTION LAB (July 10, 2016), 
http://softinteraction.com/archives/1165. 
 16. See Kotsios, supra note 6. 
 17. See, e.g., Brandon Widder, The Twenty Best Augmented-Reality Apps, DIGITAL TRENDS 
(Aug. 6, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/best-augmented-reality-apps. 
 18. NIANTIC, INC., supra note 2, at 1. 
 19. Id. at 2. 
 20. Id. at 1–2. 
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including its privacy policy.21 The relevant provision of the policy 
addresses Niantic’s data collection, storage, and disclosure practices: 
Niantic collects geolocation information of the player’s smartphone 
through “cell/mobile tower triangulation, wifi triangulation, and/or 
GPS.”22 Additionally, Niantic reserves the right in perpetuity to store23 
and disclose this information to third parties.24 
A player can begin playing after signing up and accepting 
Niantic’s Terms and Services. Gameplay occurs in three phases: (1) 
collect virtual creatures from locations in the real-world environment, 
(2) train creatures, and (3) battle another player’s creatures.25 As 
described below, AR technology permeates each stage of the game. 
1.  Gameplay 
First, a player must collect or catch a virtual creature, known as a 
Pokémon.26 To collect Pokémon, the player must visit locations in the 
real world environment, known as Pokéstops,27 which are fertile for 
collecting Pokémon.28 As the player navigates the real world, the 
underlying AR technology tracks the player’s device and provides a 
map of nearby Pokéstops.29 Alternatively, the player can view the 
physical world through the camera of the device (“camera mode”). 
Once the player arrives at a Pokéstop, the application, through AR 
technology, notifies the player that a Pokémon is available for 
collection.30 Using camera mode, the player locates the Pokémon by 
holding the device upwards and moving around the Pokéstop until the 
three-dimensional creature appears on the screen of the device, 
superimposed on the real world environment as though it were a 
physical, tangible object.31 The player then captures the Pokémon by 
swiping upwards on the screen to throw a Pokéball at the creature.32 
 
 21. See id. at 1. 
 22. Id. at 4. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 4–5. 
 25. Sam Haysom, A Beginner’s Guide: How to Play ‘Pokémon Go’, MASHABLE (July 22, 
2016), http://mashable.com/2016/07/22/pokemon-go-beginners-guide/#irtcvbSGzmqE. 
 26. Serenity Caldwell et al., Beginner’s Guide: How to Play Pokémon Go!, IMORE (Nov. 19, 
2016, 7:00 AM), http://www.imore.com/pokemon-go-beginners-guide. 
 27. Id.  
 28. See id.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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After collecting the Pokémon, the player must prepare the 
Pokémon for battle.33 This requires catching the same type of 
Pokémon by navigating the real world as described above. Collecting 
the same type of Pokémon enables the creature to evolve in its strength 
and abilities.34 
The final step of gameplay involves using the evolved Pokémon 
to battle other players’ Pokémon at designated areas, known as 
Gyms.35 Similar to locating Pokéstops, the application, through AR 
technology, provides a geographic view of nearby Gyms based on the 
location of the player’s device.36 
2.  Reactions 
Pokémon Go has generated a variety of reactions from players, 
third parties, politicians, and interest groups. Overall, players have 
embraced Pokémon Go. In the United States, Pokémon Go was 
released on July 6, 2016 and became the top grossing application 
within thirteen hours.37 As of August 2016, the application attracted 
twenty-one million users and four to five million downloads each 
day.38 Touchtone Research attributed Pokémon Go’s instant success 
to nostalgia among older players, the opportunity for player interaction 
at Gyms, and the fact that the underlying AR technology requires the 
player to navigate the real world.39 
Private entities, however, have not been as receptive to the game. 
Entities have complained that Niantic’s placement of Pokéstops and 
Gyms on their properties has been disrespectful and disruptive.40 For 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Pokémon Video Games, POKÉMON, http://www.pokemon.com/us/pokemon-video-
games/pokemon-go (last visited Nov. 8, 2016). 
 35. See Caldwell, supra note 26. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Jacob Siegal, All the Crazy Stats About Pokémon Go Collected on a Single Infographic, 
BGR (Aug. 4, 2016, 8:00 PM), http://bgr.com/2016/08/04/all-the-crazy-stats-about-pokemon-go-
collected-on-a-single-infographic. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Rich Foreman, Four Reasons Behind Pokémon Go’s Wild Success, STARTUP GRIND (Jul. 
2016), https://www.startupgrind.com/blog/4-reasons-behind-pokemon-gos-wild-success/; 
Caroline Praderio, The Simple Reason Pokémon Go is so Insanely Successful, INSIDER (Jul. 11, 
2016, 10:25 AM), http://www.thisisinsider.com/the-simple-reason-pokemon-go-is-so-successful-
2016-7. 
 40. Tim Mulkerin, You Officially Can’t Play Pokémon Go at the Hiroshima Memorial or the 
Holocaust Museum, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 9, 2016, 11:33 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/pokemon-go-pokestops-removed-from-hiroshima-memorial-and-
holocaust-museum-2016-8. Private homeowners have also complained about Niantic’s placement 
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instance, Niantic placed Pokéstops and Gyms at both the U.S. 
Holocaust Memorial Museum and the Hiroshima Peace Memorial 
Museum.41 Upon request from the Museums’ respective officials, 
however, Niantic removed these Pokémon hotspots. 
Politicians and interest groups alike have expressed data privacy 
concerns about the game. Because each phase of gameplay involves 
the geolocation of the end user’s device, Niantic may use the 
underlying AR technology to collect and disclose this information to 
third parties. Approximately one week after Pokémon Go was 
released, Minnesota Senator Al Franken expressed his concerns about 
Niantic’s uninhibited access to all players’ Gmail accounts, along with 
its collection and disclosure practices.42 Similarly, the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center urged the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”)43 to investigate Niantic’s practices and ensure that Niantic 
complied with legislation carved out for children under the age of 
thirteen.44 While remaining silent on its geolocation information 
collection and disclosure practices, Niantic assured Senator Franken 
that it remedied the issue of accessing players’ Gmail accounts.45 
Pokémon Go, and more generally AR, demonstrate the growing 
concerns regarding a non-government entity’s ability to collect, store, 
and disclose an end user’s information. These concerns are governed 
by data privacy law. 
 
of Pokéstops. In an ongoing class action suit against Niantic, plaintiffs alleged that Niantic caused 
a nuisance by placing Pokémon hotspots on their private properties without consent, which attracted 
crowds of Pokémon Go players. See Complaint at 1, Marder v. Niantic, Inc., 2016 WL 4073537 
(N.D. Cal. 2016) (No. 3:16-cv-04300); Complaint at 8–9, Dodich v. Niantic, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-
04556 (N.D. Cal. Filed Aug. 10, 2016). 
 41. Mulkerin, supra note 40. 
 42. Letter from Al Franken, Senator, Dist. of Minn., to John Hancke, Chief Exec. Officer, 
Niantic, Inc. (July 12, 2016), http://www.franken.senate.gov/files/letter/160712_PokemonGO.pdf. 
Mirroring Senator Al Franken’s data security concerns along with other “social risks,” China has 
banned Pokémon Go in part because it has also banned Google Maps, which is an integral 
component of the smartphone game. David Jagneux, China Cites National Security as It Bans 
Pokémon Go and Other AR Games, VENTURE BEAT (Jan. 15, 2017, 12:10 PM), 
http://venturebeat.com/2017/01/15/china-cites-national-security-as-it-bans-pokemon-go-and-
other-ar-games. 
 43. The FTC is the primary federal agency that regulates non-government entities’ data 
collection and sharing practices. See infra Part III.A. 
 44. Letter from Marc Rotenberg, President and Exec. Dir., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. et al. to 
Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n (July 22, 2016), 
https://epic.org/privacy/ftc/FTC-letter-Pokemon-GO-07-22-2016.pdf. 
 45. Letter from Courtney Greene Power, Gen. Couns., Niantic, Inc., to Al Franken, Senator, 
Dist. of Minn. (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.franken.senate.gov/files/documents 
/160826NianticResponse.pdf. 
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III.  DATA PRIVACY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
As announced by Boston attorneys Samuel D. Warren and Louis 
D. Brandeis in 1890, the touchstone of privacy law is “[t]hat the 
individual shall have the full protection in person and in property. . . 
[and has] the right to be let alone.”46 Over a century after Warren and 
Brandeis imparted their wisdom, the legal system struggles to adapt to 
novel notions of privacy, particularly in light of today’s digital 
landscape. In the United States, data privacy law exclusively protects 
the end user’s data, known as personally identifiable information 
(“PII”).47 PII generally refers to information that may personally 
identify the end user, such as social security numbers, passport 
numbers, and first and last names.48 As a caveat, there is no universally 
adopted definition of PII.49 Consequently, information may qualify as 
PII only for certain statutes, in certain jurisdictions.50 The 
inconsistency of what qualifies as PII is attributed to the fragmented 
structure of data privacy law. 
A.  Structure of Data Privacy Law 
In the United States, data privacy law is regulated at both the 
federal and the state level.51 At the federal level, data is not uniformly 
regulated, but instead, varies depending on the industry.52 Aside from 
these industry-specific bodies, the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) is the main regulatory body.53 The FTC is primarily 
responsible for protecting consumers from “[u]nfair methods of 
 
 46. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
 47. 1 RAYMOND T. NIMMER & HOLLY K. TOWLE, DATA PRIVACY, PROTECTION, AND 
SECURITY LAW § 2.01, at 8 (2017). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 4. 
 50. Compare Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 486 (1st Cir. 
2016) (holding the end user’s GPS coordinates are PII in the context of the Video Privacy Protection 
Act of 1988), with In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(holding the end user’s automatically generated geolocation information is not PII in the context of 
the Wiretap Act). 
 51. Lisa J. Sotto & Aaron P. Simpson, United States, in DATA PROTECTION & PRIVACY 2015 
208, 208 (Rosemary P. Jay ed., 2015), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/wp-content/uploads 
/sites/18/2011/04/DDP2015_United_States.pdf. 
 52. Id. For example, the Department of Health and Human Services regulates healthcare 
entities pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. HIPAA Enforcement, 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-
enforcement (last visited Nov. 8, 2016). 
 53. Sotto & Simpson, supra note 51, at 208. 
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competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce.”54 In the context of data privacy 
law, the FTC protects consumers by “enforcing companies’ privacy 
policies.”55 Thus, it is clear that the FTC’s responsibilities are limited 
to consumers, or end users, rather than the general public.56 
Data privacy law is also regulated at the state level and varies 
from state to state. At this level, the Attorney General has the authority 
to enforce privacy laws.57 This discussion will focus on California, as 
it is considered the model state for data privacy laws.58 California’s 
recently enacted Electronic Communications Privacy Act limits the 
government’s ability to collect and use a California resident’s 
electronic communications for law enforcement purposes.59 The 
Online Privacy Protection Act protects individuals’ privacy against 
non-government entities by requiring website owners or operators to 
give end users notice regarding the types of information they intend to 
collect and/or disclose to third parties.60 Considering the FTC’s 
purpose along with these California laws, data privacy law protects an 
end user against both government and non-government entities.61 
Furthermore, California’s laws naturally reveal two dichotomies: (1) 
users and non-users, and (2) government and non-government entities. 
B.  The Government/Non-Government Dichotomy 
To simplify privacy law, privacy actions can be divided into two 
categories:(1) actions against the government, and (2) actions against 
a non-government entity (“NGE”).62 This distinction is important 
because it dictates the legal framework courts apply in resolving 
 
 54. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012). 
 55. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 585 (2014). 
 56. Id. (noting the dominant role the FTC plays in protecting an individual’s PII). 
 57. Sotto & Simpson, supra note 51, at 208. 
 58. Kim Zetter, California Now Has the Nation’s Best Digital Privacy Law, WIRED (Oct. 8, 
2015, 9:58 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/california-now-nations-best-digital-privacy-law. 
 59. David Navetta et al., Five New Privacy Laws on Tap in California, NORTON ROSE 
FULBRIGHT: DATA PROTECTION REP. (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.dataprotectionreport.com 
/2015/10/five-new-privacy-laws-on-tap-in-california/. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546 (2016). 
 60. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–79 (2008). 
 61. Sotto & Simpson, supra note, 51 at 209–10. 
 62. Victoria Schwartz, Overcoming the Public-Private Divide in Privacy Analogies, 67 
HASTINGS L.J. 143, 146 (2015). But see, Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of 
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1095 (2002) (“The government is 
increasingly contracting with private sector entities to acquire databases of personal information.”). 
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privacy actions.63 Courts apply the Fourth Amendment64 reasonable 
expectation of privacy test65 for actions against the government.66 
Courts do not apply the Fourth Amendment for privacy actions against 
NGEs,67 but instead, rely on a variety of sources of law,68 including 
federal statutes,69 state constitutions,70 state laws,71 and FTC 
regulations.72 
Professor Schwartz of Pepperdine University School of Law 
offers four justifications for this dichotomy. First, the government is 
traditionally more powerful than NGEs because of “a combination of 
coercion, state power, and . . . monopoly features of government.”73 
This coercive power is rooted in the government’s ability to deprive 
the individual of life and liberty.74 Second, the government’s 
surveillance abilities may instill fear in an individual, deter the 
individual from making decisions that develop his or her identity, and 
ultimately chill participation in the democratic system.75 Third, the 
 
 63. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 150; Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A 
Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 298 (1983). 
 64. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”). 
 65. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (holding the government conducted an 
unreasonable search by wiretapping a telephone booth because the defendant had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy); see also id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (outlining a two-part expectation 
of privacy test); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (stating that the reasonable expectation 
of privacy test “has come to mean the test enunciated by Justice Harlan’s separate concurrence in 
Katz.”). 
 66. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 150. 
 67. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (“[T]he private sector [is] a domain 
unguarded by Fourth Amendment constraints.”); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 
(1984). 
 68. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 151. 
 69. See, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–05 (2012). 
 70. See, e.g., Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 644 (Cal. 1994) (holding 
the California constitution protects an individual’s right to privacy against both government and 
non-government entities). 
 71. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 435 (2011) (“No [public or private] employer [except the 
federal government] may cause an audio or video recording to be made of an employee in a 
restroom, locker room, or room designated by an employer for changing clothes . . .”); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 637.7 (2016) (“No person or entity in this state shall use an electronic tracking device to 
determine the location or movement of a person.”). 
 72. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 55, at 588 (“The FTC can bring an action against a company 
for breaching a promise in its privacy policy—and, even more broadly, for any deceptive or unfair 
act or practice.”). 
 73. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 174. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 176. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. 
REV. 1609, 1657 (1999) (“[L]imitless surveillance of expression in cyberspace . . . can corrupt 
individual decision-making about the elements of one’s identity.”). 
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government traditionally has better access to superior technology than 
NGEs.76 Finally, the government faces bureaucratic pressures to 
produce favorable results in the short-term without considering the 
long-term effects.77 This is particularly salient for law enforcement, 
where police forces are constantly pressured to protect the public by 
arresting suspects in a short amount of time.78 
Noting that courts often analogize between government and non-
government cases without any basis,79 Professor Schwartz developed 
a framework for courts to use in deciding whether such analogies are 
appropriate.80 The framework requires balancing the four 
justifications that explain the government/NGE dichotomy.81 Thus, a 
court resolving a privacy action against an NGE may analogize to 
Fourth Amendment cases if the NGE exhibited coercive power,82 had 
the ability to instill fear in an individual that amounts to potentially 
chilling democratic participation,83 had better access to superior 
technology,84 and faced similar bureaucratic pressures.85 
 
 76. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 178. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 
(1986) (“[I]t may well be, as the Government concedes, that surveillance of personal property by 
using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public, such as 
satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.”). 
 77. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 180. See Adam Shinar, Public Employee Speech and the 
Privatization of the First Amendment, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1, 40 (2013) (noting that bureaucracy in 
government entities is intentional and “intrinsic to government work”). 
 78. Solove, supra note 62, at 1104 (Asserting that bureaucratic pressure results in “decisions 
without adequate accountability, dangerous pockets of unfettered discretion, and choices based on 
short-term goals without consideration of the long-term consequences or the larger social effects.”). 
 79. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 147–48. Compare Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 231–32 (the 
Court preserved the public-private distinction by stating “[w]hether they may be employed by 
competitors to penetrate trade secrets is not a question presented in this case. Governments do not 
generally seek to appropriate trade secrets of the private-sector, and the right to be free of 
appropriation of trade secrets is protected by law.”), with City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 
759 (2010) (the Court did not explicitly reject the public-private analogy in the context of a 
government workplace case, but noted that some states require employers, i.e., non-government 
entities, to disclose surveillance of electronic communications). 
 80. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 180. 
 81. Id. at 187. 
 82. For example, security guards are non-government entities that have the ability to deprive 
individuals of liberty. Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 49, 50 (2004). 
 83. For example, when financial institutions call to find out if a loan applicant has a terminal 
illness, “privacy is violated in a manner about as consequential as if the same violations had been 
carried out by a government agency.” Amitai Etzioni, The Privacy Merchants: What Is to Be 
Done?, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 929, 934 (2012). 
 84. For example, Google Maps readily provides the public with access to satellite photos. 
Kevin Werbach, Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2321, 2344 (2007). 
 85. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 187. See Gerald Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in 
American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1277, 1306 (2005) (“[C]orporate bureaucratic power, as it has 
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Although Schwartz’s normative framework has the potential to 
guide courts in deciding whether analogizing is appropriate, the 
framework has its drawbacks. While Professor Schwartz provided 
examples, courts must ultimately exercise heavy judicial discretion in 
applying each factor. Because the factors are based on tradition rather 
than distinctions drawn from legislation or precedent,86 courts lack 
guidance in defining these factors, which results in a lack of 
predictability for courts and NGEs.87 This is particularly salient for the 
first factor, which is arguably the most prominent distinction between 
government and NGEs. Although Schwartz defined the first factor as 
“a combination of coercion, state power, and the monopoly features of 
government,”88 a number of questions arise: What is meant by 
coercion? What are specific monopolistic features of the government? 
Moreover, Professor Schwartz noted that the most extreme form of 
coercive power is the government’s ability to deprive the individual of 
life or liberty,89 suggesting that coercive power operates on a 
spectrum. This proves problematic if a court is faced with an NGE that 
falls in the middle of the spectrum. 
Because courts must exercise heavy judicial discretion in defining 
and applying the four factors, the framework as a whole is 
unpredictable and may aggravate the inconsistencies in data privacy 
law. This is particularly relevant for NGEs. As stated above, courts do 
not apply the Fourth Amendment to privacy cases against NGEs, but 
instead rely on a variety of sources of law, including federal law, state 
constitutions, state law, and FTC regulations—some of which do not 
incorporate the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy test.90 If the court determined that analogizing was 
 
emerged, has imposed a forceful objective restraint on the shareholders’ ability to govern the 
corporation.”). 
 86. By way of analogy, Congress codified four factors in the fair use doctrine from copyright 
law. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). These factors guide courts in deciding whether a defendant’s use 
of a plaintiff’s copyrightable work is authorized. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. 
Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 551 (2008). Scholars note that, 
notwithstanding this legislation and a rich body of precedent, courts define each factor 
inconsistently. See Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 
23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391 (2005). 
 87. Predictability in the rule of law is one of the highest priorities in the judicial system. Kem 
Thompson Frost, Predictability in the Law, Prized Yet Not Promoted: A Study in Judicial Priorities, 
67 BAYLOR L. REV. 48, 51 (2015). 
 88. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 174. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 151. 
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appropriate, then NGEs may be subject to the Fourth Amendment 
reasonable expectation of privacy test, which may be different from 
the applicable laws that govern NGEs. This unpredictability may 
discourage NGEs from developing and manufacturing products that 
could affect the end user’s privacy, such as applications that integrate 
the user’s geolocation information. 
IV.  GEOLOCATION INFORMATION 
As a preliminary matter, geolocation information (“GI”) refers to 
the specific locations of an electronic communications device, such as 
a smartphone or a tablet.91 While GI may be generated in a few 
different ways,92 the most relevant is the Global Positioning System 
(“GPS”), which utilizes a system of satellites to accurately pinpoint 
the location of a device.93 The U.S. Department of Defense initially 
developed the GPS for military purposes in order to bolster national 
security.94 This purpose became one of the four underlying policies of 
the GPS, along with “effectively contribut[ing] to . . . public safety, 
scientific, and economic interests of the U.S. . . .”95 Since its 
inception, the GPS has been adopted in contexts outside the military, 
such as driving navigation96 and agriculture.97 Furthermore, mobile 
application developers have increasingly incorporated the GPS into 
their applications to generate GI98 and unsurprisingly, a recent study 
 
 91. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S. 1011, 112th Cong. 
(2011). 
 92. See In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 
2013) (noting that GI is generated through cell-site towers, the Global Positioning System, and 
wireless routers). 
 93. See Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth 
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 414 (2007). 
 94. Aaron Renenger, Note, Satellite Tracking and the Right to Privacy, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 549, 
550 (2002). 
 95. 51 U.S.C. § 50112 (2012). 
 96. Roads & Highways, GPS.GOV, http://www.gps.gov/applications/roads (last visited Mar. 
18, 2017). 
 97. Agriculture, GPS.GOV, http://www.gps.gov/applications/agriculture (last visited Mar. 18, 
2017). 
 98. Will Fulton, Five Great Location-Based Games That Aren’t Pokémon Go, DIG. TRENDS 
(July 18, 2016, 11:27 AM), http://www.digitaltrends.com/gaming/best-location-based-gps-games/. 
In February 2012, the FTC reported that many mobile applications that target children 
automatically collect geolocation information. FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE APPS FOR KIDS: 
CURRENT PRIVACY DISCLOSURES ARE DISAPPOINTING (Feb. 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites 
/default/files/documents/reports/mobile-apps-kids-current-privacy-disclosures-are-
disappointing/120216mobile_apps_kids.pdf. 
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revealed that 90% of Americans use their smartphone for geolocation-
related purposes.99 
A.  The Government/Non-Government Dichotomy 
Geolocation information is one example of the dichotomy 
between the government and NGEs in data privacy law. Consequently, 
the Fourth Amendment ensures protection against government privacy 
intrusions. The Supreme Court recently confirmed this principle in a 
case involving GI. In United States v. Jones, the government placed a 
GPS device on defendant Jones’ vehicle and tracked his geolocation 
for four weeks.100 The Supreme Court resolved the issue of whether 
Jones’ Fourth Amendment right had been violated and held that 
tracking Jones’ location via the GPS constituted a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.101 Therefore, Jones corroborates 
that the Fourth Amendment indeed protects an individual’s GI against 
government intrusions. 
Because GI exemplifies this dichotomy, presumably an end user’s 
GI is protected against NGE’s, such as technology companies and 
mobile application developers. In Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. 
Network, Inc., the defendant media company developed and 
distributed a news and entertainment mobile app.102 Each time the 
plaintiff end user watched a video on the app, the defendant shared the 
plaintiff’s GI with third party companies.103 The First Circuit held that 
GI qualified as PII under the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 
and the Act prohibits disclosing GI to third parties.104 Therefore, the 
First Circuit confirmed that, at least under the Video Privacy 
Protection Act, an end user’s GI is protected against NGEs, such as 
mobile application developers. 
B.  The FTC’s Geolocation Privacy Concerns 
The marriage between mobile applications and the GPS presents 
an interesting paradox: While Google Maps efficiently delivers 
 
 99. Monica Anderson, More Americans Using Smartphones for Getting Directions, Streaming 
TV, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/01/29/us-
smartphone-use. 
 100. 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012). 
 101. Id. at 949. 
 102. 820 F.3d 482, 484 (1st Cir. 2016). 
 103. Id. at 485. 
 104. Id. at 489; see 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1) (2012). 
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driving directions and Pokémon Go encourages social and physical 
activity in the real world, this marriage allows an NGE to freely collect 
and disclose GI virtually unopposed. An NGE’s freedom, according 
to the FTC, raises four privacy concerns: (1) targeted advertising, (2) 
stalking or physically harming the end user, (3) lack of end user’s 
consent, and (4) hackers committing cybercrimes. 
Underlying the first concern is the possibility that an NGE may 
collect or disclose an end user’s GI for targeted advertising.105 By 
collecting an end user’s aggregate GI, the NGE can build the end 
user’s profile of recently visited locations.106 The NGE may use this 
profile to target advertising to the end user through his or her device.107 
The FTC also expressed the concern that an NGE may collect or 
disclose this information to the end user’s detriment.108 Specifically, a 
criminal may identify the end user’s current or future GI and use this 
information to stalk or physically harm the end user.109 Moreover, 
there is also the possibility that an NGE collects and discloses this 
information without the end user’s express consent.110 This is 
particularly troublesome if NGEs use or disclose the GI for 
unspecified purposes, e.g., selling the information to the 
government.111 Lastly, an NGE’s ability to collect and disclose an end 
user’s GI may increase the possibility of a privacy breach.112 
Specifically, a hacker may access the NGEs GI database to commit a 
cybercrime, such as identity theft.113 
C.  The Stored Communications Act 
Notwithstanding the FTC’s enumerated privacy concerns, 
currently there is no federal legislation that expressly protects an end 
 
 105. The Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014: Hearing on S.2171 Before the Subcomm. 
for Privacy, Tech. & the Law of the U.S. S. Comm. on the Judiciary, at 2–3 (June 4, 2014) 
[hereinafter Senate Hearing] (prepared statement of the Federal Trade Commission), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/313671/140604locationprivacyact
.pdf; In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 138 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 106. Senate Hearing, supra note 105, at 2. 
 107. In re Smartphone, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 138. 
 108. Senate Hearing, supra note 105, at 2. 
 109. ISACA, GEOLOCATION: RISKS, ISSUES AND STRATEGIES, 8 (2011), 
http://www.isaca.org/groups/professional-english/wireless/groupdocuments/geolocation_wp.pdf. 
 110. Senate Hearing, supra note 105, at 3. 
 111. See Solove, supra note 62, at 1095. 
 112. Senate Hearing, supra note 105, at 2. 
 113. ISACA, supra note 109. 
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user’s GI.114 Instead, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 
1986 presumably governs.115 While this Act consists of three titles, the 
most relevant is Title II, known as the Stored Communications Act 
(“SCA”). The SCA protects an end user’s stored electronic 
communications (“SEC”)116 against a provider’s (NGE’s) 
compelled117 and voluntary118 disclosure to the government. While the 
SCA unambiguously regulates an NGE’s disclosure practices, it is 
unclear whether the SCA protects GI generated from mobile 
applications, such as Pokémon Go. 
To qualify for SCA protection, as a threshold matter, GI must 
qualify as an SEC. To qualify as an SEC, GI must be “temporar[ily 
and] intermediate[ly]” stored by either: (1) an electronic 
communication service (“ECS”), or (2) a remote computing service 
(“RCS”).119 An ECS must allow end users to communicate.120 An 
example is WhatsApp: a mobile application that allows end users to 
communicate through a text message platform and share their 
respective locations.121 If the end user chooses to share his or her 
location, WhatsApp temporarily stores the user’s GI.122 An RCS, in 
contrast, is an NGE that offers “computer storage or processing 
services.”123 For example, Dropbox provides cloud storage for files, 
such as documents and photos. If an end user opts to automatically 
upload files from a smartphone, Dropbox tracks the smartphone’s GI 
and restarts the upload when it detects a significant change in the 
location.124 Therefore, Dropbox collects GI in order to process and 
 
 114. Jennifer Ann Urban, Has GPS Made the Adequate Enforcement of Privacy Laws in the 
United States a Luxury of the Past?, 16 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 401, 414 (2016). 
 115. Christian Levis, Note, Smartphone, Dumb Regulations: Mixed Signals in Mobile Privacy, 
22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 191, 204 (2011). 
 116. Storage Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2012). 
 117. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide 
to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1218 (2004); See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012). 
 118. Kerr, supra note 117; See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012). 
 119. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(a) (2012). 
 120. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2012). 
 121. FAQ, WHATSAPP, https://www.whatsapp.com/faq/en/iphone/ 
20964587 (last visited Feb. 8, 2017). 
 122. WhatsApp Legal Info, WHATSAPP, https://www.whatsapp.com/legal/#terms-of-service 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2017). 
 123. 18 U.S.C.§ 2711(2) (2012). 
 124. Background Uploading—Why the Dropbox iOS App Needs Location Data, DROPBOX, 
https://www.dropbox.com/en/help/209 (last visited Feb. 8, 2017). 
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upload files.125 Because WhatsApp and Dropbox qualify as an ECS 
and RCS, respectively, the SCA governs their disclosure practices. 
The SCA, however, does not protect Pokémon Go players. 
Assuming that a Pokémon Go player’s GI is “temporar[ily and] 
intermediate[ly]”126 stored, Niantic is not an ECS because Pokémon 
Go players cannot directly communicate with each other through the 
application itself. Nor does Niantic qualify as an RCS because it does 
not collect and store a player’s GI merely for storage or processing 
services. Consequently, the SCA does not protect Pokémon Go 
players and end users of other mobile applications that integrate GI in 
a similar manner. Rather, these end users are only entitled to Fourth 
Amendment protection against the government.127 
V.  THE PROPOSED LOCATION PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT 
As stated in Part I, Pokémon Go, and more generally AR, 
demonstrate an NGE’s uninhibited ability to collect, store, and 
disclose an end user’s GI to third parties without consent. 
While current federal legislation does not regulate this ability,128 
the Location Privacy Protection Act (“LPPA”) proposes to bridge this 
gap by prohibiting NGEs from collecting or disclosing end users’ GI 
without consent, absent an exception.129 
This Note identifies legislative gaps in the LPPA and 
recommends appropriate amendments (collectively “amended 
LPPA”) in hopes of accomplishing three goals. First, this Note ensures 
that the amended LPPA protects an end user’s geolocation privacy in 
light of the FTC’s concerns. Today, technology companies, like 
mobile application developers, capitalize on new technologies, such 
as AR. Without much thought, end users give in to these technologies 
for convenience or mere entertainment. These users, however, may not 
realize that these companies may freely collect, store, and disclose 
their GI to undisclosed third parties for undisclosed purposes. This 
creates an information asymmetry between companies and end users 
that, according to the FTC, raises four privacy concerns: specifically 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(a) (2012). 
 127. Kerr, supra note 117, at 1213. 
 128. Urban, supra note 114, at 414. 
 129. Location Privacy Protection Act, S. 2270, 114th Cong. § 2713 (2015). 
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targeting advertisements at end users;130 physically harming end 
users;131 collecting end users’ GI without consent,132 and; hackers 
committing cybercrimes against end users.133 
This Note also ensures that the amended LPPA remains consistent 
with the policies underlying the GPS. The LPPA’s first and foremost 
concern is protecting an end user’s privacy over GI. Although this 
right is important, it must be balanced against the policies of national 
security, public safety, scientific interests, and economic interests134 
that underlie the system that generates GI. 
While the ultimate goal of the amended LPPA is to protect an end 
user’s GI in light of privacy and policy concerns, the amended LPPA 
also promotes predictability for courts and NGEs alike by prescribing 
bright line rules. Professor Schwartz noted that courts arbitrarily 
decide when to analogize between government and non-government 
privacy violations,135 and proposed a four-factor framework to 
determine whether such analogies are appropriate.136 This framework, 
however, requires heavy judicial discretion in defining and applying 
each factor. The solution must be legislative. The amended LPPA 
reduces the judicial discretion that Professor Schwartz’s framework 
sought to counteract by expressly identifying what NGEs can and 
cannot do with an end user’s GI. 
A.  Interpretation 
Minnesota Senator Al Franken introduced the LPPA to amend the 
Electronics Communications Privacy Act. This Note focuses on five 
provisions of the LPPA: (1) the general prohibition, (2) exceptions, (3) 
the stalking and domestic violence provision, (4) the publication 
requirement, and (5) enforcement. 
First, the LPPA generally prohibits a non-government individual 
or entity (“covered entity”) from knowingly collecting or disclosing 
an end user’s GI without express consent.137 In isolation, this provision 
 
 130. Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 105; In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 
977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 138 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 131. Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 105. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. 51 U.S.C. § 50112 (2012). 
 135. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 147–48. 
 136. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 187. 
 137. Location Privacy Protection Act, S. 2270, 114th Cong. § 2713(b)(1) (2015). 
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undoubtedly protects the end user’s geolocation privacy. Notably, this 
provision is silent on a covered entity’s ability to store an end user’s 
GI. This ability, however, is implied because the LPPA does not 
require a covered entity to disclose the information within a specified 
period of time after initially collecting the information. Because a 
covered entity may store the information in perpetuity, this ability can 
be read into the statute. Therefore, the LPPA requires consent to 
collect, store, and disclose the end user’s GI. 
The LPPA also enumerates nine exceptions that allow a covered 
entity to collect and disclose an end user’s GI without consent. The 
relevant exceptions may be classified into the following categories: 
(1) disclosure to a parent or guardian locating a minor, a ward, or a 
legally incompetent person; (2) disclosure for other emergency 
purposes; (3)  disclosure pursuant to a court order or for law 
enforcement purposes; (4) disclosure to operate a network; (5) 
necessary disclosure to another person for any of the previously 
mentioned exceptions; (6) disclosure to protect the NGE’s property, 
its customers, or another entity from unlawful conduct, and; (7) 
disclosure to any other covered entity that did not initially collect 
information from the end user’s device.138 
Moreover, the LPPA’s stalking and domestic violence provision 
prohibits the knowing and willful disclosure of an end user’s GI to 
another covered entity for these purposes.139 The LPPA also imposes 
a fine, imprisonment for a maximum of two years, or both, regardless 
of the end user’s consent.140 
Additionally, the LPPA requires a covered entity to publish its 
privacy policy on a website. This policy must include the purpose of 
collection and disclosure, the specific non-governmental recipients of 
disclosure, and the end user’s ability to revoke consent.141 This 
provision, however, only governs a covered entity that collects GI 
from at least 1,000 devices in a year.142 
Lastly, the LPPA provides the means of enforcing its provisions. 
The enforcement provision requires the Attorney General to work with 
 
 138. Id. § 2713(b)(2). 
 139. Id. § 2266(a). 
 140. Id. § 2266(b). 
 141. Id. § 2713(b)(4). 
 142. Id. 
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the FTC to “issue regulations to implement the requirements of this 
regulation.”143 
B.  Legislative Gaps and Recommendations 
1.  The LPPA’s Silence on Storage 
The LPPA undoubtedly regulates a covered entity’s ability to 
collect and disclose an end user’s GI. Consequently, the LPPA does 
not explicitly address an NGE’s ability to store an end user’s GI, but 
this ability is implied. Since the LPPA does not regulate storage 
practices, an NGE can store an end user’s GI in perpetuity. 
Perhaps the LPPA drafters intended to defer to the Stored 
Communications Act. This is plausible considering that the SCA 
immediately precedes the proposed LPPA. It is unlikely, however, that 
the drafters intended to defer to the SCA because the LPPA only 
modifies Section 2702(c) of the SCA, which regulates a provider’s 
(NGE’s) ability to voluntarily disclose a subscriber’s information.144 
Therefore, the LPPA’s modification only applies to a provider’s 
disclosure practices, which does not address the provider’s storage 
practices. 
Even if the drafters intended to defer to the SCA, the SCA does 
not adequately address an NGE’s ability to store an end user’s GI. As 
stated above, the SCA only protects a “temporar[ily and] 
“intermediate[ly]” stored electronic communication.145 Assuming that 
GI qualifies as an SEC, the next and more important issue is whether 
the SCA limits an NGE’s ability to store an end user’s GI. The SCA 
only regulates a provider’s (NGE’s) compelled146 and voluntary147 
disclosure to the government. The SCA, therefore, only regulates an 
NGE’s disclosure practices and is virtually silent on storage practices. 
Because of this silence, the only viable solution is to amend the 
proposed LPPA. 
 
 143. Id. § 2713(c)(1). 
 144. Id. 
 145. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(a) (2012). 
 146. Kerr, supra note 117, at 1218. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012). 
 147. Kerr, supra note 117, at 1218. 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012). 
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2.  Recommended Amendments 
The recommended solution is three-fold: (1) amend the general 
prohibition; (2) add the storage limit provision,148 and; (3) amend the 
publication provision. 
First, the general prohibition should be amended to reflect a 
covered entity’s ability to store the end user’s GI. Accordingly, this 
provision should read: “Except as provided in paragraph (2), a covered 
entity may not knowingly collect, store, or disclose to another covered 
entity the geolocation information from an electronic communications 
device without the consent of the individual that is using the electronic 
communications device.”149 
Next, the LPPA should include a provision that imposes a time 
limit on storing an end user’s GI. This storage limit provision should 
read: “A covered entity who collects the geolocation information from 
an electronic communications device may store such information for 
X amount of time.” 
The publication provision should be amended to better inform the 
end user of the covered entity’s storage practices. This provision 
should read: “A covered entity that collects the geolocation 
information . . . shall maintain a publicly accessible Internet website 
that includes . . . the amount of time it intends to store the end user’s 
geolocation information pursuant to the time limit imposed in [the 
second recommended amendment].” 
Unlike the preceding provisions, the enforcement provision 
should not be amended because it clearly and unambiguously 
delegates enforcement to the Attorney General and the FTC. Even in 
the absence of this provision or other federal legislation, the FTC 
publicly supported the LPPA’s initiatives and vowed to continue to 
enforce privacy violations against NGEs.150 Because the enforcement 
provision simply formalizes what the FTC has vowed to do, this 
provision should remain status quo. 
 
 148. The drafters of the LPPA did not hesitate to draw bright line rules. For example, Section 
2713(b)(4) only requires publication if the covered entity collects GI from at least 1,000 electronic 
communications devices. 
 149. Location Privacy Protection Act, S. 2270, 114th Cong. § 2713(b)(1) (2015). 
 150. Senate Hearing, supra note 105, at 12. 
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C.  Justifications 
The amended LPPA first and foremost seeks to protect an end 
user’s geolocation privacy. This section demonstrates that the 
amended LPPA accomplishes this goal in light of the FTC’s 
enumerated privacy concerns and the policies underlying the GPS, 
with the added benefit of promoting predictability in data privacy law. 
1.  The FTC’s Privacy Concerns 
The FTC articulated four concerns associated with GI: (1) 
targeted advertising, (2) stalking or physical harm, (3) lack of an end 
user’s consent, and (4) hackers committing cybercrimes. This section 
determines whether the amended LPPA addresses these concerns. 
First, the FTC articulated a concern regarding an NGE’s use of an 
end user’s GI for targeted advertising without consent.151 None of the 
LPPA’s exceptions allow collection or disclosure for targeted 
advertising. This purpose is unnecessary for locating a minor or 
incompetent person, other emergencies, for law enforcement 
purposes, or out of necessity. Nor is disclosure required to protect the 
NGE, its customers, or other NGEs. Notably, the last exception allows 
a third party’s collection or disclosure if the third party did not conduct 
the initial collection. Thus, the third party must lawfully acquire this 
information from a covered entity under one of the previous 
exceptions. Because these exceptions apply to a targeted end user in 
limited circumstances, it is very unlikely that the covered entity will 
disclose a significant proportion of user GI to a third party. 
Consequently, the ambitious third party must rely on collecting an end 
user’s GI individually. Requiring collection on an individual basis 
imposes high transactional costs that are likely to deter the third party. 
Therefore, the proposed LPPA addresses the targeted advertising 
concern. 
The FTC also noted the possibility that an NGE may collect an 
end user’s GI to locate and/or harm the user.152 Two of the LPPA’s 
provisions directly address this concern. The necessity exception 
allows an NGE to collect or disclose GI if it is necessary to protect the 
end user from unlawful conduct. This provision affirmatively protects 
the end user from physical harm. The stalking and domestic violence 
 
 151. Senate Hearing, supra note 105; In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. 
Supp. 2d 129, 138 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 152. Senate Hearing, supra note 105. 
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provision prohibits an NGE’s disclosure to stalk or commit domestic 
violence against the end user.153 This provision also imposes criminal 
penalties to deter such conduct.154 Because the LPPA allows 
disclosure to prevent harm and criminalizes such use for stalking or 
domestic violence purposes, the LPPA addresses the FTC’s second 
concern. 
The FTC also recognized that an NGE may collect an end user’s 
GI without the end user knowing.155 The policies underlying this 
concern are transparency, allowing the end user to make better-
informed decisions, and preventing unfair or deceptive practices.156 A 
few of the LPPA’s provisions address this concern. The LPPA’s 
general prohibition requires the end user’s consent for collection. 
Coupled with the publication requirement, the end user has ample 
access to the covered entity’s GI collection practices. These 
requirements may provide the end user with actual knowledge of—or 
at least make it more likely that the end user has knowledge of—the 
covered entity’s data practices.157 The LPPA’s exceptions allow 
collection or disclosure without the end user’s express consent in very 
limited circumstances. The underlying policies for these exceptions 
outweigh the end user’s geolocation privacy. For instance, the first 
category of exceptions exhibits a strong policy of protecting minors 
and legally incapacitated persons. The legal purposes exception 
promotes the policy of assisting law enforcement to protect the general 
public. The necessity exception, as described above, protects the end 
user from harm. It is clear that the LPPA does not afford the individual 
the absolute right to privacy, but rather, balances this right with strong 
public policies. Notwithstanding these exceptions, the LPPA 
addresses the FTC’s third concern. 
Lastly, the FTC articulated the possibility of hackers accessing an 
end user’s GI to commit a cybercrime, such as identity theft.158 At the 
 
 153. Location Privacy Protection Act, S. 2270, 114th Cong. § 2266(a) (2015). 
 154. Id. § 2266(b). 
 155. Senate Hearing, supra note 105. 
 156. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012). 
 157. This assumption breaks down considering that most end users consent to privacy policies 
without reading them. Amanda Grannis, Note, You Didn’t Even Notice! Elements of Effective 
Online Privacy Policies, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1109, 1154 (2015); see Sarah Gordon, Privacy: 
A Study of Attitudes and Behaviors in U.S., U.K. and E.U. Information Security Professionals, 
SYMANTEC SECURITY RESPONSE WHITE PAPER 12 (2003), 
https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/privacy.attitudes.behaviors.pdf. 
 158. Senate Hearing, supra note 105. 
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heart of this concern are an NGE’s storage practices. If an NGE did 
not store an end user’s GI, there would be absolutely no risk of a 
privacy breach because there would be nowhere to steal the 
information from. While the NGE’s ability to store an end user’s GI 
may be implied from the general prohibition provision, none of the 
LPPA’s provisions regulate this practice. The recommended storage 
limit provision bridges this gap and prevents NGEs from perpetually 
storing an end user’s GI. A defined time limit restricts the amount of 
time for hackers to unlawfully access this information, and thus, 
reduces the opportunity for a privacy breach.159 Therefore, in reducing 
this opportunity, the LPPA and the recommended amendments 
address the FTC’s final concern. 
Although the preceding provisions address the FTC’s enumerated 
privacy concerns, these provisions are meaningless without 
enforcement. The LPPA’s enforcement provision unambiguously 
delegates the role of enforcement to the Attorney General and the 
FTC. Therefore, the amended LPPA addresses the FTC’s privacy 
concerns associated with GI. 
2.  GPS Policies 
As stated above, the amended LPPA intends to protect the end 
user’s right to privacy over his or her GI. This right, however, must be 
balanced against the policies underlying the very system that generates 
GI: the Global Positioning System. These policies include: (1) national 
security, (2) public safety, (3) scientific interests, and (4) economic 
interests.160 
The U.S. Department of Defense originally developed the GPS 
for military purposes to bolster national security.161 In its current state, 
the LPPA does not directly address national security concerns, such as 
the potential that databases consisting of end user information will be 
hacked.162 By requiring covered entities to obtain consent before 
collection and disclosure, the end user ultimately decides whether to 
 
 159. Notably, it may not be feasible to completely eliminate the possibility of a privacy breach 
because the only solution is to prevent NGEs from collecting and storing an end user’s GI. The 
LPPA’s exceptions, however, underscore important countervailing policies that weigh in favor of 
collection and storage. 
 160. 51 U.S.C. § 50112 (2012). 
 161. Renenger, supra note 94, at 550. 
 162. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Cyberattack the Next Pearl Harbor?, 18 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 
233 (2016). 
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contribute his or her GI to this database. The end user’s decision 
directly impacts national security by influencing the size of the 
database or the potential hacking target. The recommended storage 
limit provision directly promotes national security because a time limit 
minimizes the time frame for an entity—whether foreign or local—to 
hack into a covered entity’s database of GI. Therefore, the amended 
LPPA promotes the policy of national security. 
The amended LPPA must also be considered in light of the public 
safety policy. The most relevant LPPA portions are the necessity 
exception and the stalking and domestic violence provision. The 
necessity exception allows an NGE to collect or disclose GI if it is 
necessary to protect the end user from unlawful conduct. The LPPA 
allows such use to protect the end user or his or her property from 
harm. Moreover, the stalking and domestic violence provision 
explicitly prohibits disclosure to stalk or commit domestic violence 
against an end user. This provision also imposes criminal penalties. 
On a superficial level, these provisions only protect the end user. But 
considering that most individuals use mobile applications that require 
collecting GI, the LPPA protects a significant portion of the 
population.163 Therefore, the LPPA promotes the policy of public 
safety. 
The amended LPPA must also be balanced against the scientific 
interests of the U.S. In the geolocation context, this refers to 
researching and developing GPS technology.164 While the amended 
LPPA does not directly address this policy, it limits covered entities’ 
collection, storage, and disclosure practices. Broadly, these limitations 
exhibit Congress’s power to restrict how covered entities use the 
information the GPS generates. Because these limitations may 
discourage technology companies from developing GPS technology, 
the amended LPPA has the potential to impede scientific progress. 
These limitations, however, may promote efficiency in scientific 
progress by providing clear rules for technology companies to follow. 
Therefore, while the amended LPPA does not directly address 
scientific interests, it may obstruct or promote this policy. 
The final policy to consider is the economic interests of the U.S. 
The underlying concern is that the amended LPPA chills researching 
 
 163. Anderson, supra note 99. 
 164. See 10 U.S.C. § 2281(b) (2012) (expanding how GPS may be applied for transportation 
and other civilian purposes). 
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and developing GI because it unduly burdens covered entities. This is 
a distinct possibility, particularly if covered entities have a financial 
stake in the GI itself. On the contrary, the amended LPPA could be 
framed as bright line rules that promote competition. By requiring all 
covered entities to abide by the same rules, covered entities may be 
incentivized to think outside the box and invest in other creative and 
productive ventures that place goods on the market for public 
consumption. This consumption will contribute to the economy and, 
therefore, the LPPA and the recommended amendments promote the 
policy of economic interests. Taken together, the amended LPPA 
promotes each policy underlying the GPS. 
3.  Predictability 
One of the greatest criticisms of U.S. data privacy jurisprudence 
is its unpredictable nature, which arises from the fragmented 
enforcement structure. The LPPA represents a shift in remedying this 
structure in two ways. First, as a federal bill, the LPPA casts a wide 
net in regulating an NGE’s GI collection, storage, and disclosure 
practices at both the federal and state level. 
Second, the amended LPPA effectively eliminates the current 
heavy judicial discretion165 by providing courts with bright line rules. 
The amended general prohibition provision and recommended 
amendment explicitly require an NGE to obtain consent before 
collecting, storing, and disclosing an end user’s GI. The LPPA’s 
enumerated exceptions allow these practices without an end user’s 
consent in limited, unambiguous circumstances. The storage limit 
provision specifies the maximum amount of time a non-government 
entity may store the information. The amended publication 
requirement lists the types of information the NGE must include in its 
privacy policy. The enforcement provision delegates the enforcement 
to the Attorney General and the FTC. In tandem, these provisions 
provide bright line rules, leaving minimal room for interpretation, and 
therefore, promote predictability for courts and NGEs alike. 
D.  Caveats 
While this Note narrowly focuses on the amended LPPA and an 
NGE’s storage practices in light of numerous privacy and policy 
 
 165. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 147–48. 
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considerations, it leaves a several areas unexplored. First, this Note 
only focuses on select provisions of the LPPA. These provisions, 
however, are most relevant for the narrow purpose of this Note, which 
is to address an NGE’s storage practices. Notably, this omission does 
not undermine the importance of the other provisions. 
This Note does not address how an NGE may store an end user’s 
GI. The how refers to the mechanics surrounding the NGE’s storage 
practices, including its ability to contract third parties. This how issue 
concerns the NGE’s direct relationship with third parties. While this 
indirectly affects the end user, this only focuses on the direct 
relationship between the NGE and the end user. Notwithstanding that 
the how issue is beyond the scope of this Note, it may be an important 
area for future legislation to regulate. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Today’s digital landscape presents novel technologies that pose 
practical difficulties for protecting an individual’s right to privacy. In 
part, this is due to the subtle complexities of such technologies. An 
example is augmented reality. AR is convenient because it eliminates 
the need for an intermediary device by providing information directly 
to the user. In the context of Pokémon Go, however, the application 
developer requires players’ consent to collect, store, and disclose their 
GI to undisclosed third parties. Although a lawsuit has not yet been 
filed, policy makers and interest groups alike have expressed concerns 
over the privacy implications arising from Pokémon Go. Therefore, 
the underlying issue is whether the law adequately protects an end 
user’s GI against non-government entities, such as mobile application 
developers. 
As the law stands, the answer is an emphatic no. The law clearly 
protects an individual’s right to privacy against the government. An 
end user’s privacy from a non-government entity, however, is limited. 
Currently, non-government entities may freely collect, store, and 
disclose an end user’s geolocation information without consent. 
Although the Location Privacy Protection Act proposes to bridge this 
gap, it is unclear if the Act imposes a time limit on storing this 
information. This Note recommends legislative amendments to the 
federal bill to address storage practices in light of privacy and policy 
concerns. Additionally, these amendments serve to guide lawmakers 
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in enacting bright line rules of law to promote predictability, of which 
privacy law has been sorely lacking. 
That technology develops more quickly than the law adapts is one 
of the realities that policymakers, judges, and lawyers alike face in 
today’s world. But, reality and technology aside, this should not 
diminish an individual’s right to privacy in the real or digital world. 
 
